German foreign policy, between the years of 1933 and 1945, was heavily dictated by Adolf Hitler, the then leader of Nazi Germany. Although there are no official policies of the time a large proportion of Nazi foreign policy can be concluded from Hitler's writing and speeches. A very conclusive point of Hitler's foreign policy was the concept of Lebensraum, or living room in English. This concept would see the mass deportation of Russians and Poles from their homes to make way for German colonists. The idea was spurred on by the desire by Hitler to provide ample room for the German race to expand into.
Hitler's concept of German racial supremacy is a common underlying theme in Hitler's foreign policy. Hitler's belief that the German race could defy any odds and win, leading to a very aggressive approach to diplomacy. Hitler more than anything else wanted to prove this theory in actual combat, mimicking the wars of von Bismarck, but on a much larger level. However, due to the British policy of Appeasement, Hitler's dreams were stopped at every turn.
Appeasement proved that for all the propaganda that Hitler and his followers could muster, in action, as long as Britain continued to gave concessions to Hitler, war would be averted for as long as possible. This crucial time brought the Allied nations time to prepare for rearmament, especially for France, who at the time struggled with fears of not only another war but also a communist revolution.
This amalgamation of fears restricted the French Government on how quickly they could rearm, it also provided a clear reason as to why war would not be beneficial to the French people on a whole, much of whom suffered terribly under the conditions of the First World War. In comparison, Hitler's government had a very tight grip on the country and whipped up a fury of nationalism and fanaticism, allowing for rearmament and conscription, the like of which Europe had never seen.
Hitler's inclusion of Austrians as Germans lent to a large part of German international policy. By claiming the Austrians as German, Hitler abused the old claims of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, including Czechoslovakia and part of Poland and Yugoslavia. These claims didn't stop at enemies of Hitler, or even those who he considered less than German, for example, according to Hitler's foreign policy parts of Axis nations, like Italy and Hungary, were up for integration into the German Reich.
This complex and overlapping series of claims and nationalist movements soon became overshadowed once war broke out. Because of this, Hitler's foreign policy also adapted and changed to the fluctuating balance of the war. A prime example of this, is the German delectation of war against the Soviet Union. With the failures of the Italian army in North Africa, German oil reserves began to run low and as such an alternative had to be found. This came in the form of the Caucus oil wells, found in Russia. This need, combined with the already built animosity between the Nazis and the Soviets, despite the Non-Agression Pact, meant that Hitler could easily justify the war and using already established tactics believed he could lead to a quick Victory and subsequent domination of Europe.
Of course, this did not come about, and Germany's loss at the hands of the Allies complete erased the ideas of German supremacy in both racial and diplomatic means.
This was a far cry from the established sucesses of the early and Pre War processes. After constant success in negotiating the return of the Rhineland and Austria and acquisition of the Sudetenland and parts of Yugoslavia, quickly faded post war.
In conclusion, German foreign during the 1930s and 40s was so heavily controlled by Hitler that most of it has been left to speculation. But we can conclude that from the evidence Hitler left and the events that unfolded, that although incredibly successful at the start, the same aggressive bravado proved to be fatal for Germany and Nazisism on a whole after the war.
Comments