Many ideas have been explored as to what caused the outbreak of the Second World War. But none so much as the policy of appeasement adopted by the western democracies of Britain and France in the 1930s. This essay will cover very briefly the consequences of appeasement in the context of diplomatic and military history and will be a short analysis of why the Second world War broke out in 1939 and why France surrendered in 6 weeks of the German offensive.
Appeasement and the loss of deterrence
“War is the continuation of politics through other means” – Clausewitz
For the most part it is the people of a nation that determine the policies of governments in western democracies through elections and democratic institutions. The policy of appeasement that was adopted by the British and particularly the French in the 1930’s can be surmised as the result of their prior experiences in the First World War. France had endured 4 years of carnage and mayhem in the bloody trenches in their countryside, both the French and British had lost over 1.3 million men and 1.1 million respectively (Casualties WW1, 2020). The psychological and social impacts of the First World War were immense and resulted in the ideas of world disarmament and efforts to avoid another war in Europe at all costs. In 1933 the Oxford Union Society declared that it would “not fight for King and Country”. In France, books and references to French victories such as ‘Verdun’ were removed from school curriculums for they were deemed dangerous to the peace. In the Netherlands large capital warships were renamed to ‘flotilla leaders’ instead of their traditional class names of ‘Destroyers’ or ‘Cruisers’ as it was seen to be provocative (Hanson 2017). This kind of culture and thinking ultimately resulted in the policy of appeasement, as summarised by Prime Minister Chamberlain to “avoid war altogether for all time” (Holland 2010).
Technically it is coercion that is regarded as the antithesis of deterrence. However, I have found that not to be the case. Deterrence goes on the underlying presumptions that you have (1) the power to inflict damage or losses an enemy (2) that you are willing to use this power (3) the opponent you are trying to deter recognises this and does not act under false presumptions or misconceived assertations. Appeasement undermines 2 of these 3 criteria, in the sense that by appeasing you show weakness in your resolve to use the power and convey a misperceived perception of your strength to your opponent. It is ironic that through the policy of appeasement the western nations of the Second World War lost one of the most fundamental and guaranteed forms of preventing war, deterrence, and ensured Nazi and Fascist aggression.
The Battle of France
The Battle of France which started on the 10th of May 1940 is regarded as one of the most stunning campaigns in military history. Hitler and his generals achieve in 6 weeks what the Kaiser’s Imperial army could not in 4 years with almost 2 million dead. For the most part the combined Western Allies outnumbered the Wehrmacht 151 divisions to 135. They had almost twice the amount of artillery (14,000 to 7,378), more tanks (4,204 to 2,439) and almost twice the amount of operational aircraft (5000 to 2500) (Horne, 1969). Their weapons and technology for the most part was either equal or superior to their German counterparts.
When Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, the Western approaches to Germany were wide open to the allied forces, yet there was no offensive. Despite being militarily superior and given the opportunity to attack an open flank the Allies stayed within their defensive positions along the border (Hanson, 2016). The policy of Appeasement still dominated the minds of Allied statesmen and Generals. The results of such a thinking and culture to avoid losses and to avoid war in general had setback the armed forces of the allies, still stuck in the mentality of fighting the last war and not progressing on to learn their previous mistakes and to recognise that despite the wealth and affluence regained after the First World War, peace is still a very fragile thing.
Finally the assault that would ensue on the 10th of May showed how such a mentality can prove fatal, an enemy whose resolve is absolute and knows very few boundaries, a people who when given the opportunity to exact revenge can through willpower, overcome their opponents. As described by General Guderian in his treatise on tank tactics prior to the war he describes the form of soldier needed to wield his new weapons as having “a fanatical will to move forward” (Guderian 1999). A sharp contrast to the mentality of the soldiers and people on the Allies.
References
‘Casualties ww1’ (2020) Wikipedia. Available at https://enhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I_casualties (Accessed 23rd February 2020)
Clausewitz, C. (1989). On War. Princeton: Princeton University.
Guderian, H (1999). Achtung Panzer. London. Cassell
Hanson, V. D. (2016). ‘Why World War 2 Matters’. Hillsdale College.
Hanson, V.D (2017). The Second World Wars. New York. Basic Books
Holland, J. (2010). The Battle of Britain. London. Transworld publishers
Horne, A (1969). To Lose a Battle. London. Macmillan
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